Abstract-We discuss some techniques currently used by intruders to control groups of compromised machines (botnets). We show how honeynets can be used to identify, monitor and understand the behavior of botnets. We describe a real attack in detail, illustrating analysis techniques developed specifically for botnets. The tools, network topology and strategies we describe can easily be adopted by other researchers and the network security community.
Introduction
The continuous growth of Internet services and resources in recent years has led to a substantial increase in server attacks, computer intrusions, and other illegal activities. Once underground hacker groups were motivated mainly by the need to communicate and share information among themselves, and the desire to learn more about computer systems. Now that financial transactions and commerce are commonly conducted through computer networks, however, Internet criminals have changed their goal to the illicit acquisition of financial resources [6] . This malicious activity has inspired more and more sophisticated attacks.
The easiest targets are computers with large bandwidth and long uptimes (servers, for example). These may be located at universities, enterprises or even certain private homes. The more such systems an attacker controls, the greater their power to perform other malicious acts. A set of compromised computers under the control of a single attacker is called a botnet.
(The term is a juxtaposition signifying "robot network".)
Most botnets rely on the IRC protocol to exchange information between the controller and its clients, also known as bots, IRC bots, drones and zombies [1] . Several kinds of bots are available, such as Agobot, SDBot, Spybot, GTBot and Eggdrop. They have different levels of sophistication related to command and control, but their basic function is the same.
Once a system is compromised, the attacker uploads a bot from his malware repository and installs it on the machine. The bot connects to one or more channels on an IRC server and waits for commands [3] . Usually, the process of constructing a botnet follows the logical sequence presented below:
The controller sends a "log in" command 1)
over the IRC channel, to distinguish their own bot from other possible watchers.
The controller uses the bot to scan for 1) networks, selecting the IP range, scanning interval and other parameters;
This information helps identify vulnerable 1)
systems that can be targeted in future attacks;
The controller uses the bot to launch 1) attacks against vulnerable systems, sending commands via the IRC channel (for example, by changing the channel topic);
If these attacks are successful, the bot 1)
propagates to other computers;
The newly installed bots try to connect to 1)
an IRC server, completing the cycle.
By this means, an attacker can compromise and control a reasonable number of machines to send SPAM, launch further scans and attacks, capture keystrokes, maintain a malware repository, and so on. By constantly repeating the cycle, a controller can maintain the size of their botnet even as some hosts are lost (by breaking communication with the IRC server, turning off, or identifying the security breach).
By studying botnets and the techniques used to build them, we can curtail criminal activities relying on this architecture. Botnets in general may have the following objectives:
Information gathering: some bots have the ability to capture keystrokes, screenshots, files, network traffic, and other data. These capabilities may be used for collecting bank card information, gathering strategic and commercial documents from a competitor, etc.
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks: botnets are commonly used to launch ICMP ECHO, TCP or UDP floods, overwhelming the target machine's resources and making it unavailable. Such attacks are much more effective when many computers are used.
Spam forwarding: unsolicited e-mails (spam) can be effectively distributed using botnets, which provide greater coverage and are harder to block.
Malware repository: botnet controllers need Internet resources to keep their tools easily available. To this end, some machines are used as repositories; botclients have been observed accessing and downloading malware from compromised FTP and HTTP servers. Placing these tools on several machines guarantees their continued availability even if some bots are lost.
Illegal content hosting: botnets can be used to store illegal content such as phishing sites, stolen information (files, documents, and credit card numbers), and pornography.
Anonymity: when several machines around the globe are used as stepping-stones to access a compromised host, it is very difficult to perform a traceback and identify the real attacker or botnet controller.
Their myriad uses explain why botnets are currently of great concern to the information security community [9] . The first step towards mitigating this threat is to deeply understand the internal working of botnets and the techniques employed by those who use them. This work presents a systematic approach to gathering information on botnets.
Related Works
The literature has seen much discussion of honeynets (a network of high interaction honeypots that simulates a production network and configured such that all activity is monitored and recorded) [14] and botnets as distinct subjects. Several works describe and compare important features of the most well-known bots [1, 3, 6, 7] . However, some of the newer techniques observed 35 M. Sacchetin et. al in botnets, such as the use of encrypted control commands, are not often discussed in papers. In this work we describe how honeynets can be used to identify and study these new techniques.
Reference [7] explains how botnets can be used to commit crimes and provides a general description of their control mechanisms, including methods other than the usual IRC approach. Reference [3] focuses on the four most common botclients: Agobot, SDBot, SpyBot and GT Bot. It describes in detail their architectures, how their control mechanisms work, how they spread, and the kinds of attacks employed.
Reference [1] explains how honeynets can be used to obtain information on the operation of botnets. That work also offers a general description of some kinds of bots. The present paper takes a similar approach, in that its main purpose is to offer a methodology useful for identifying and analyzing common types of bots. In addition, however, we wish to analyze a new threat: bots that use encrypted commands to make their detection and identification more difficult.
Although there are numerous ways to compromise a honeypot (a single honeynet computer), such as exploiting web service vulnerabilities [6] , this work discusses the case of honeypots compromised through vulnerabilities in their NETBIOS protocol-based services.
In Section 3, our honeynet architecture is presented. The methodologies and tools used to analyze captured bots are described in Section 4. An isolated environment (sandbox) used to study bots is presented in Section 5. In Section 6, we present a detailed, real-world case study of botnet analysis and its results. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Using Honeynets to Study Botnets
The first step of this study is the identification of botnets. A honeynet allows attackers to compromise its computers and install botclients, an effective way to research the state of malware.
One of the main advantages of honeynets is that all traffic can be monitored and logged [14] . All of the intruder's actions are recorded, from the initial exploitation to any and all All traffic within the honeynet is transparently monitored by an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) and copied onto a file server called the Log Host. The goal is to passively gather as much information as possible, so that one can infer the techniques used to compromise the honeypots. Analysis of the traffic log also permits one to capture malware, locate the malware repository, find the IP addresses of other bots and perhaps the controller, and so on.
In the next section we detail our techniques for obtaining and analyzing information on the invading botnet .
Analysis
Several attacks are registered by the Brazilian Honeynet every day, from all over the globe. Each one is identified and analyzed, then reported to the authorities and other competent organizations. Due to the increased use of botnets for illegal activities, the Brazilian Honeynet team has been paying close attention to incidents making use of this technology. To facilitate the study of botnets, we have developed a special methodology to analyze these events.
The first challenge is to identify which attacks are related to botnet activities. Due to the large number of IRC-based bots captured by the honeynet, we focus our research on this kind of bot. To this end, it was necessary to develop practical and effective ways to identify IRC-based bot activity inside the honeynet.
Tools such as honeysnap [19] , ngrep [11] , tcpdump [16], Smart [2] and Sebek [17] can detect the presence of a bot by analyzing the honeynet's collected data. More sophisticated techniques such as machine learning can also identify botnet activities in network traffic [8] , but satisfactory results require accurate statistical modeling of the environment. While interesting, such details lie beyond the scope of this work.
Once the presence of a bot has been confirmed, the next step is to discover all actions performed by the intruder. This is accomplished by analyzing the compromised honeypot itself. We collect all commands executed by the intruder during the attack and all information exchanged between the controller and the botclient -IRC server address, channel names, passwords and server ports. We also try to recover the malware used to install the bot, either by forensic analysis of the compromised machine or by extracting it from logged network traffic. One can even download the malware directly from its repository with the username and password just collected, if it is still up and running. Once the malware has been captured, dynamical analysis can be done in a sandbox built for this purpose. A detailed example of this process is presented in Section 6.
The tools
This subsection provides a general description of the tools used to identify IRC-based botnets. The next subsection will show how they can be used together to analyze a botclient.
Norton Ghost
Norton Ghost [15] is used to produce Windows operating system images, allowing full restoration of the system state. It is used to recover from failures or compromises that make the system unusable.
This tool can be used as follows: a default Windows installation is performed, the current state is saved, and then the malware is executed. After finishing the analysis, the hard disk can be zeroed and an identical initial state restored in preparation for new analysis.
However, as Norton Ghost is commercial software and supports only Windows systems, we prefer the Partimage tool.
Partimage
Partimage [5] is very similar to Norton Ghost, but is free and based on linux/unix. It can generate either Linux or Windows images, as it supports ext2fs/ext3fs, Reiserfs, FAT16/32, NTFS (experimental), and other file systems.
This tool was used to restore operating systems in our sandbox. Due to the fact that it is linux-based, the deployment of automatic restoring mechanisms was very easy. Although NTFS support is considered experimental by its developers, no problems occurred during the tests performed.
Honeysnap
This very useful tool parses pcap-based network traces. Honeysnap generates a summary of all activities in a given time interval: packets, HTTP sessions, e-mails, etc. It is also capable of extracting files downloaded via FTP or HTTP, which is very convenient in cases where intruders delete their malware after use. Other useful features include the summarization of IRC sessions and a keyword search.
Tcpdump
Tcpdump is one of the most widely used traffic analyzers. It is capable of capturing all traffic within some predefined collision domain of a TCP/IP network, and stores all packet information 37 M. Sacchetin et. al for later analysis. It can save the traffic content in pcap format, the standard for most network analysis tools.
The network traffic can be analyzed using logical filters known as BPF filters. These filters can separate events by port, IP address, protocol, and other criteria.
Snort
Snort [13] is a free, network-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) commonly used by the security community. It compares packets in the network traffic against a database of known attack patterns, called signatures. When a match is found, Snort issues an alert. After the attack is confirmed, a deeper analysis of the event is performed.
Ngrep
This tool is used to search for regular expressions or hexadecimal characters in network traces, and supports pcap files. It works with Ipv4/6, TCP, UDP, ICMPv4/6, IGMP and other protocols, and like tcpdump supports BPF filters.
Ngrep is very useful for finding keywords related to IRC traffic in the honeynet network traces. A few commands are usually enough to identify the IP addresses and ports through which the bots are generating network traffic.
Sebek
Sebek is a tool designed to capture honeypot data and register all of the intruder's activities in a stealthy manner. All data and keystrokes produced by an intruder in the compromised host are captured and sent to the log host. This is one way of confirming that the honeypot has been compromised, and provides a general view of the intruder's actions. Sebek captures a great deal of important information for later analysis of the bot.
Smart
Like Sebek, this tool captures the data generated by intruders in compromised honeypots. However, it also provides information on the system's response to executed commands. This tool was developed by the Brazilian Honeynet Project during its deployment, and is described more fully in reference [2] .
Shell Scripts
The IDS also runs some shell scripts to help the analyst with honeynet management tasks. Daily, weekly and monthly log rotations are automated so that full-time data collection does not deplete the server's disk space.
Monitoring mechanisms (Snort, tcpdump, Smart and Sebek) are also executed via scripts, guaranteeing that every alert generated by one of these tools is stored for analysis. It is important to mention that the IDS also immediately reports attacker activities inside a honeypot. That is, whenever a honeypot is compromised the manager receives an e-mail like that shown in Figure 3 . A script running on the IDS crontab checks every five minutes for Sebek, Smart or modified bash data related to intruder activities.
In the example of Figure 3 , commands were executed in honeypot XX.XX.XX.37 to open an IRC channel (JOIN #aDDa). Attempts were also made to connect with FTP servers XX.XX.XX.178 and XX.XX.XX.98, probably to download The data generated by Smart confirm the intrusion [21] , as noted in the daily summary (bottom of Figure 2 ). At this point the analyst is sure that honeypot XX.XX.37 has been compromised, and that a botclient has been installed. One can now start looking for information related to the botnet control protocol, which is the focus of this paper.
For example, the analyst may want to know more about the server that the honeypot is connected to. He currently knows only that honeypot XX.XX.37 is trying to join channel "#aDDa". The IP of the hosting server can easily be found using ngrep, searching for the string "aDDa" with the BPF filter "host XX.XX.37". Specifically, the analyst can use the following command: One can also search for common IRC commands such as "PING", "PONG", "NICK", "TOPIC", etc. However, the previous output is enough to conclude that the honeypot has connected to server XX.XX.80 on port 10324.
At this point, the entire file can be analyzed via tcpdump:
#tcpdump -X -s 1500 -nr /var/log/tcpdump/ dump_file20070310 host XX.XX.XX.80 and host XX.XX.XX.37 and port 10324
By listing all traffic between this client and server, one can harvest lots of information related to the botnet itself: the list of all channels to which the bot tried to connect, as well as passwords, topics, and nicknames.
The honeysnap tool can also be used, and generates more user-friendly output. Honeysnap can remount an entire IRC session based on the network dump file, so the data are displayed as if it were a common IRC client program.
#honeysnap/var/log/tcpdump/dump_ file20070310 -H XX.XX.XX.37 --do-irc --ircports=10324
The following command tells honeysnap to interpret a pcap file containing botnet traffic:
An example of honeysnap output is presented in Section 6, where bot analysis is discussed. Section 5 completes the methodology portion of this paper, describing how the sandbox provides a detailed understanding of botclient behavior.
The Sandbox
Static information is a very common obstacle to botnet analysis. For example, a security analyst might always use the same source IP address, or always try to join the same channels using the same nicknames. This behavior pattern can alert the botnet controller that he is under surveillance. Another cause for suspicion is the presence of IP addresses coming from anonymous networks such as TOR [18] .
The botnet controller will respond by blacklisting that source IP address and nickname, and might inform his associates about the incident. Thus, honeynet managers need to be very careful when analyzing botnets.
A sandbox is an analysis environment isolated from the botnet controller. Initially virtual machines were used as sandboxes, but it is now fairly common for botclients and other malware to protect their binary content and avoid file execution when they detect a virtual machine environment [10] .
Another concern is the analysis response time. Techniques exist that allow botnet controllers to rapidly modify their malware [20] , even before the analysis is completed. Thus, if the analysis takes too long its results might be erroneous.
Within a sandbox environment, all these obstacles can be overcome. Our sandbox consists of two machines (Figure 4) . The monitoring machine has an IRC server and can be accessed by the botclient. This Linux system is completely isolated from the Internet, monitors all network traffic, and runs tcpdump, Snort, honeysnap and ngrep. The IRC server configuration is based on information gathered during the initial traffic analysis (server name, channels, passwords, nicknames, etc.).
The second machine runs Windows or Linux, depending on the captured malware. The disc is zeroed using the "dd" tool [4] before OS installation. Just after installation, a system disc image is copied to the monitoring system: this image can be restored whenever the analyst wishes. After initial installation or restoring of the base system, the botclient binary is copied to the machine and executed. This environment ensures that all traffic is generated by the botclient (with the exception of some OS traffic such as Windows NBT packets), greatly reducing the time and effort expended on analysis.
The sandbox can be used to investigate how the bot server and client communicate, how the controller sends commands to the bot, the meaning of those commands, and the botclient response for each command (start a network port scan, harvest base machine information, etc.).
The next section presents a real example of botnet analysis using all the resources and techniques previously described.
Botnet Detection and Analysis Using Honeynet

The Zip0 Bot
On January 17 th , our honeynet manager received an alert email from the IDS about a honeypot compromised by the Sasser worm [12] . The daily summary showed that honeypot XX.XX.164 presented outgoing traffic in many ports, including port 80.
All related packets were listed with tcpdump. After verifying the contents, we noticed that the traffic was not a common HTTP communication despite being directed to port 80.
After using ngrep, we concluded that the traffic was related to an IRC communication. Honeysnap provided a rich visualization of these data:
This summary contains the following valuable information:
--The bot server operated on port 80, was located in the USA (California), and used the name compress.zip0.com.ar (XX.XX.13.91).
--The server password is <zip0. compresspass>, the bot's username is [0] USA|0309293, and the bot connected to channels #zip0-s# and #zip0-d1#, and #zip0-d2#; --The channel topics were:
As soon as a bot connects to a server, it starts generating traffic very similar to that shown below: These data make it possible to configure an IRC server (in the sandbox) that acts like the original bot server in many ways. The bot will connect to this fake server, thinking it has connected to the real server.
After running the botclient on the sandbox, we deduced that commands were being provided through channel topics. The analyzed botnet, named "zip0", uses the binary executable "h.exe" as a client. This malware was captured from the botnet controller FTP server.
We were able to access the FTP server using information gathered by Sebek and Smart (user, password and server address). On the server we found 3 identical executables with different names:
artefato: h.exe , j.exe , z.exe md5: b2ef11a82e287e6f0bf3fe57274adf11
The observed behavior was as follows: as soon as the malware executes, it installs itself on the system under the name "MSSCF32.exe". It then deletes the original executable (e.g. "h.exe") and adds a registry entry to execute the botclient every time the machine starts up.
"MS System Call Function"="MSSCF32.exe" After it is properly installed, "MSSCF32.exe" tries to connect to the server "compress.zip0.com. ar". This can easily be observed in the collected network traffic. The monitoring computer responds to the bot's DNS request as if it were the host "compress.zip0. com.ar". At this point the bot starts connecting to our monitoring machine. After establishing a connection, the botclient remains inactive for about 40 minutes then starts some scans. These can be observed in the Sebek data. This command is clearly related to the topic of channel "zip0-d2": "adv5c4n napi_445 50 3 0 -r -t -s". The scan itself can also be analyzed using tcpdump: Thus, the relationship between channel topic and botclient behavior can be used to understand how a botnet controller operates and learn his intentions.
The honeynet is able to monitor every channel topic change. New topics can be provided to the sandbox, and new behaviors observed. This feature of the system is very important; even if the botnet controller starts to use encryption, we will still be able to identify the bot's response to new commands.
Conclusion
In this paper we have discussed some of the features that make botnets a serious threat to network security. We have also shown how honeynets can be helpful in understanding botnet behavior.
Using a honeynet and a sandbox, it is possible to learn how botnet controllers command their bots to execute various operations. We have also provided a real example, where commands and parameters are passed to the bot by IRC channel topic. Their effects on the bot were analyzed in a sandbox environment, revealing the intruder's intentions. This methodology has been based entirely on freely available software tools, allowing researchers to reproduce our work according to their needs.
